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## Cause and effect book answer key

is evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy'd. The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that effect, which they differ. Every idea is possible, which is a necessary and infallible conclusion as far as possible. This inclination, 'tis true, is suppress'd by a little reflection, and only takes place in children, poets, and the antient philosophers. What is the reason of this difference, but that immobility, not being natural to the hare, but that particular of industry, forms in that case a strong relation with the hunter, which is wanting in the other? A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one. Of the four sources of moral distinctions, this is to be ascrib'd to the third, viz. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. As resemblance, when conjoin'd with causation, fortifies our reasonings; so the want of it in any very great degree is able almost entirely to destroy them. Ought the Roman empire at that time to be esteem'd hereditary, because of two examples; or ought it, even so early, to be regarded as belonging to the stronger, or the present possessor, as being founded on so recent an usurpation? Here are two persons, who dispute for an estate; of whom one is rich, a fool, and a bachelor; the other poor, a man of sense, and has a numerous family: The first is my enemy; the second my friend. Every new imposition of morality, therefore, must arise from some new relation of objects, and not from the mere force of reason. The same is to be said of the effects of the passions, which are the effects of the imagination. The imagination is the source of all our ideas, and it is by the imagination that we are affected with the passions; and when we have been accusom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. 'Tis a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. Since we can be vain of a country, climate or any inanimate object, which bears a relation to us, 'tis no wonder we are vain of the qualities of those, who are connected with us by blood or friendship. For what reason? Suave mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem: Non quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas, Sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suav' est. How few criminals are there, who have no ill-will to the person, that accuses them, or to the judge, that condemns them, even tho' they be conscious of their own deserts? This philosophical system, therefore, is the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. Fourth Experiment. My design in the present work is sufficiently explain'd in the introduction. Such an exception of this is, therefore, rather a confirmation of the rule. This operation of the mind has been so fully explain'd in treating of the probability of chance, that I need not here endeavour to make it more intelligible. Upon the whole, I conclude, that the idea of an infinite number of parts is individually the same idea with that of an infinite extension; that no finite extension is capable of containing an infinite number of parts; and consequent that no finite extension is infinitely divisible[6]. Add to this, that the pride, or self-applause, be it what it will, is a passion, which is the effect of the imagination, and not of the reason. The imagination is the source of all our ideas, and it is by the imagination that we are affected with the passions; and when we have been accusom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second, by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. 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any female. We are naturally desirous of what is forbid, and take a pleasure in performing actions, merely because they are unlawful. This is the case with all the impressions, whose objects are suppos'd to have an external existence; and is the case with the impressions, whether gentle or violent, voluntary or involuntary. The invention of nature, concerning the stability of possession, has already render'd men tolerable to each other; that of the transference of property and possession by consent, has begun to render men mutually advantageous: But still these laws of nature laws; however strictly observ'd, are not sufficient to render them so serviceable to each other, as by nature they are fitted to become. Nor does the mind rest there; but returning back upon its footsteps, transfers to their predecessors and ancestors that right, which it naturally ascribes to the posterity, as being related together, and united in the imagination. To confirm this we may add the following argument, which to me seems perfectly decisive and convincing. The difference betwixt an idea produc'd by a general connexion, and that arising from a particular one is here compar'd to the difference betwixt an impression and an idea. A peasant wou'd think himself happy in what cannot afford necessities for a gentleman. The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ'd to account for the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtilty and refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplish'd genius and understanding. Of this kind is the conjunction of the properties of different persons, after such a manner as not to admit of separation. You must surely have some idea of a right line, to which this line does not agree. For 'tis easily possible, by gradually diminishing the numbers, to reduce the longest series of addition to the most simple question, which can be form'd, to an addition of two single numbers; and upon this supposition we shall find it impracticable to shew the precise limits of knowledge and of probability, or discover that particular number, at which the one ends and the other begins. Now 'tis evident, that the inference of the judgment is here much more lively than what is usual in our common reasonings, and that a man has a more vivid conception of the vast extent of the ocean from the image he receives by the eye, when he stands on the top of thea high promontory, than merely from hearing the roaring of the waters. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral; and therefore shall not at present be enter'd upon. The general rule is attributed to our judgment, as being more extensive and constant. As it has a double task to perform, it must be endow'd with double force and energy. No weakness of human nature is more universal and conspicuous than what we commonly call Credulity, or a too easy faith in the testimony of others; and this weakness is also very naturally accounted for from the influence of resemblance. We sympathize with those people in their uneasiness; and as their uneasiness proceeds in part from a sympathy with the person who insults them, we may here observe a double rebound of the sympathy; which is a principle very similar to what we have observ'd on another occasion[87]. IF the second part of my system be true, that the idea of space or extension is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order; it follows, that we can form no idea of a vacuum, or space, where there is nothing visible or tangible. Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. They extend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally suppos'd criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended. Nothing is more curiously enquir'd after by the mind of man, than the causes of every phenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. Of the Origin of our Ideas. Besides we may consider, that when we receive harm from any person, we are apt to imagine him criminal, and 'tis with extreme difficulty we allow of his justice and innocence. This we shall consider afterwards. Proceeding then in that reasoning, wherein we have advanc'd three steps; that chance is merely the negation of a cause, and produces a total indifference in the mind; that one negation of a cause and one total indifference can never be superior or inferior to another; and that there must always be a mixture of causes among the chances, in order to be the foundation of any reasoning: We are next to consider what effect a superior combination of chances can have upon the mind, and after what manner it influences our judgment and opinion. But with respect to beasts there cannot be the least suspicion of mistake, which must be own'd to be a strong confirmation, or rather an unpleasible proof, of my system. A man, who has the palsey in one hand, has as perfect an idea of impenetrability, when he observes that hand to be supported by the table, as when he feels the same table with the other hand. The reason of the difference certainly must be, that the memory is exerted without any sensation of pleasure or pain; and in all its middling degrees serves almost equally well in business and affairs. Here 'tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the females; at the same time that the women, who love and esteem him, have no prospect of receiving that enjoyment themselves, and can only be affected by means of their sympathy with one, that has a commerce of love with him. We shall begin with examining the passions of pride and humility, and shall consider the vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just proportion. HAVING thus explain'd the manner, in which we reason beyond our immediate impressions, and conclude that such particular causes must have such particular effects; we must now return upon our footsteps to examine that question, which[27] first occur'd to us, and which we dropt in our way, viz. But as 'tis certain, that our esteem or deference extends beyond any prospect of advantage to ourselves, 'tis evident, that that sentiment must proceed from a sympathy with those, who are dependent on the person we esteem and respect, and who have an immediate connexion with him. For this reason they always admire the beauty, utility and rarity of what is abroad, above what is at home. This relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions. The intellectual world, tho' involv'd in infinite obscurities, is not perplex'd with any such contradictions, as those we have discover'd in the natural. Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. I doubt not but these consequences will at first sight be receiv'd without difficulty, as being evident deductions from principles, which we have already establish'd, and which we have often employ'd in our reasonings. For shou'd we ask ourselves one obvious question, viz. BUT here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for making use of that faculty, and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I shou'd be disappointed, and that I shou'd in vain depend upon [your] gratitude. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them. But notwithstanding this, 'tis certain, that when we wou'd govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions, and rather take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly call'd his reason. Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the most horrid and unnatural is ingratitude, especially when it is committed against parents, and appears in the more flagrant instances of wounds and death. Every part must appear single and alone, nor [can] regularly have entrance into the fancy without banishing what is suppos'd to have been immediately precedent. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since 'tis evident, that the passion is much better satisfy'd by its restraint, than by its liberty, and that inby preserving society, we make much greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than inby running into the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and an universal licence. For what is the memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by inlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible. This figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. These questions are decisive, and must not be eluded. 'Tis certain, then, that if the power of producing pleasure and pain forms not the essence of beauty and deformity, the sensations are at least inseparable from the qualities, and 'tis even difficult to consider them apart. And tho' young men are not asham'd of every head-ach or cold they fall into, yet no topic is so proper to mortify human pride, and make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature, than this, that we are every moment of our lives subject to such infirmities. If any one is of a contriving real, and different from the power of producing pleasure, it can never be disputed, that as surprize is nothing but a pleasure arising from novelty, it is not, properly speaking, a quality in any object, but merely a passion or impression in the soul. Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, it must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other. V. Every thing belonging to a vain man is the best that is any where to be found. All this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human nature; and as these passions and principles are inalterable, it may be thought, that our conduct, which depends on them, must be so too, and that 'twou'd be in vain, either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a view to public interest. It shall therefore be allow'd for a moment, that the production of one object by another in any one instance implies a power; and that this power is connected with its effect. An idea is a weaker impression; and as a strong impression must necessarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the same with its copy or representative. The first may be thus explain'd. That proposition therefore is not intuitively certain. We blame all disloyalty to magistrates; because we perceive, that the execution of justice, in the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and the performance of promises, is impossible, without submission to government. Now 'tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions. Such a subtilty is a clear proof of the falshood, as the contrary simplicity of the truth, of any system. The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves, become at last indivisible; and these indivisible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not fill'd with something real and existent. These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence; and indeed I must confess, that philosophy has nothing to oppose to them, and expects a victory more from the returns of a serious good-humour'd disposition, than from the force of reason and conviction. In short, this principle is support'd by such a number of common and vulgar phaenomena, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of insisting on it any farther. Our present business, then, must be to find some natural production, where the operation and efficacy of a cause can be clearly conceiv'd and comprehended by the mind, without any danger of obscurity or mistake. For 'tis observable, that in this particular her conduct is different in the different passions and sensations. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. Every particular fact is there the object of belief. If the sensation of the passion and desire be opposite, nature cou'd have alter'd the sensation without altering the tendency of the desire, and by that means made them compatible with each other. We may, therefore, infer, that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoin'd with them, by the original constitution of the mind. We have observ'd, that our approbation of those, who are possess'd of the advantages of fortune, may be ascrib'd to three different causes. Where am I, or what? -- A complete answer key for all the exercises in the Cause & Effect student text 2. In this case 'tis sufficient to have ears to learn the truth. The most proper method, in my opinion, of giving a satisfactory explication of this act of the mind, is by producing other instances, which are analogous to it, and other principles, which facilitate its operation. And on this is founded that reproach of Cornelia to her sons, that they ought to be asham'd she shou'd be more known by the title of the daughter of Scipio, than by that of the mother of the Gracchi. Were we fully convinc'd, that our resembling perceptions are continu'd, and identical, and independent, we shou'd never run into this opinion of a double existence, since we shou'd find satisfaction in our first supposition, and wou'd not look beyond. This agency of the supreme Being we know to have been asserted by[49] several philosophers with relation to all the actions of the mind, except volition, or rather an inconsiderable part of volition; tho' 'tis easy to perceive, that this exception is a mere pretext, to avoid the dangerous consequences of that doctrine, till at last it swells up to a considerable bulk, greater or smaller, in proportion as I repeat more or less the same idea. In like manner every quality, which by being directly consider'd, produces hatred, ought always to give rise to pride by comparison, and by a mixture of these passions of hatred and pride ought to excite contempt or scorn. It may, perhaps, be said, that after experience of the constant conjunction of certain objects, we reason in the following manner. The repetition of perfectly similar instances can never alone give rise to an original idea, different from what is to be found in any particular instance, as has been observ'd, and as evidently follows from our fundamental principle, that all ideas are copy'd from impressions. When I receiv'd the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, as principles of union among ideas, without examining into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have display'd on that subject. But this distinction is entirely frivolous. But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. Of greatness of mind. Now since the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures; it follows, that in all enquiries concerning these moral distinctions, it will be sufficient to shew the principles, which make us feel a satisfaction or uneasiness from the survey of any character, in order to satisfy us why the character is laudable or blameable. All lovers of virtue (and such we all are in speculation, however we may degenerate in practice) must certainly be pleas'd to see moral distinctions deriv'd from so noble a source, which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of humanour nature. [Many of these images are suppos'd to concur, and a superior number to concur on one side. If we have really an idea of power, we may attribute power to an unknown quality. But as 'tis impossible, that that idea can be deriv'd from such a quality, and as there is nothing in known qualities, which can produce it; it follows that we deceive ourselves, when we imagine we are possess'd of any idea of this kind, after the manner we commonly understand it. 'Tis suppos'd to be founded on intuition, and to be one of those maxims, which tho' they may be deny'd with the lips, 'tis impossible for men in their hearts really to doubt of. The case, however, is otherwise. For as this latter object is suppos'd uncertain, and as the uncertainty is deriv'd from a conceal'd contrariety of causes in the former, were any of the causes plac'd in the known qualities of that object, they wou'd no longer be conceal'd, nor wou'd our conclusion be uncertain. If my philosophy, therefore, [makes no addition to the arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing remains precisely as before. Benevolence attends both: But is connected with love in a more eminent degree. The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos'd specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. When we consider these objects with the utmost attention, we find only that the one body approaches the other; and that the motion of it precedes that of the other, but without any sensible interval. But tho' these reasons may induce us to comprehend this delicacy of the imagination among the causes of the respect, which we pay the rich and powerful, there are many other reasons, that may keep us from regarding it as the sole or principal. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them. To which we may add, that this agreement or disagreement, not admitting of degrees, all virtues and vices wou'd of course be equal. 'Tis necessary for us to leave the direct survey of this question concerning the nature of that necessary connexion, which enters into our idea of cause and effect, and endeavour to find some other questions, the examination of which will perhaps afford a hint, that may serve to clear up the present difficulty. In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of two kinds; but in each kind the phaenomena are obvious, numerous, and conclusive. The expression being once brought in as subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise; nor will a man be less bound by his word, tho' he secretly give a different direction to his intention, and with-hold himself both from a resolution, and from willing an obligation. Let any one examine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be the truth. We are frequently in doubt concerning the ideas of the memory, as they become very weak and feeble; and are at a loss to determine whether any image proceeds from the fancy or the memory, when it is not drawn in such lively colours as distinguish that latter faculty. In this particular both these degrees of belief are alike. The pleasing sensation arising from beauty; the bodily appetite for generation; and a generous kindness or good-will. And this we may observe to be the source of all the relations of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and are placed in the ties of government and subordination. It may now be ask'd in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and evil. From what principles is it derived, and whence does it arise in the human mind? These vulgar opinions, then, being rejected, we must search for some other hypothesis, by which we may discover those peculiar qualities in our impressions, which makes us attribute to them a distinct and continu'd existence. This reflection is, that the persons, who are proudest, and who in the eye of the world have most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest; nor the most humble always the most miserable, as may at first sight be imagin'd from this system. The interest of a nation requires, that the succession to the crown shou'd be fix'd one way or other; but 'tis the same thing to its interest in what way it be fix'd: So that if the relation of blood had not [an effect independent of public interest, it wou'd never have been regarded, without a positive law; and 'twou'd have been impossible, that so many positive laws of different nations cou'd ever have concurr'd precisely in the same views and intentions. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species. A mechanic with regard to motion. The howlings and lamentations of a dog produce a sensible concern in his fellows. Tho' this progress of the sentiments be natural, and even necessary, 'tis certain, that it is here forwarded by the artifice of politicians, who, in order to govern men more easily, and preserve peace in human society, have endeavour'd to produce an esteem for justice, and an abhorrence of injustice. Nor have we only our reason to trust to for this principle, but also experience. Yet 'tis easy to remark, that on some occasions it has a considerable influence upon them. Instances of this kind are very numerous and frequent.

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